|Title: Stock Market Information Production and Executive Incentives|
|Reference Number: 1139|
|Publication Date: April 2005|
|JEL Classifcation: D80, G14, G34, J33|
| Author(s): |
We find that an informationally efficient stock market induces firms to rely more heavily on pay-for-performance schemes. We construct five stock market informativeness measures using stock trading data and analysts' earnings forecast data. These variables, individually and collectively, account for the cross-sectional variation in chief executive officer (CEO) payperformance sensitivity well. Our results are robust to the choice of estimators, samples, time periods, incentive measures, model specifications, and estimation methods. We also analyze the properties of the pay-performance sensitivities of nonCEO executives and executive teams; These have similar properties as CEO pay-performance sensitivity.
Key words: Market microstructure, pay-performance sensitivity, probability of informed trading, analysts' earnings forecast